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THE CHOICE-BASED PERSPECTIVE OF CHOICEOF-LAW
SAGI PEARI*
This Article offers an innovative basis for the choice-of-law question: the
Choice-Based Perspective (CBP). The main argument is that there exists
an alternative rights-based understanding of choice-of-law to that which is
presently known as the “vested rights” theory. This understanding is based
on the legal philosophy of perhaps the greatest expositor of the rightsbased concept, Immanuel Kant. In contrast to alternative approaches, CPB
insists on a purely private conception of the subject, grounded on an
organizing principle of unity of persons’ choices. Furthermore, the
proposed approach holds much sway in practice, for the normative
underpinnings of CBP are already embedded in many traditional and
contemporary choice-of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts.
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INTRODUCTION
[C]hoice of law was one of the easiest subjects because there was really
only one rule for all areas of private law: “You apply the law most
substantially connected,” he would say with a subtle accent. As a
student, I felt that was an unhelpful generalization. On other occasions,
when students were troubled by inconsistencies between implications of
the established choice of law rule and the outcome of the particular
cases, he would observe calmly that the courts routinely manipulated the
rules to produce a just result. I found this frustrating: either the decision
in question was wrong, or the rule was in need of reformulation, or we
had failed to appreciate the consistency between the two.1

In the above-quoted passage, contemporary choice-of-law scholar
Professor Janet Walker expresses concerns about her former choice-of-law
teacher’s vision of the subject. This vision seems to be grounded on a
problematic general principle and exception. The general principle refers to
the somewhat amorphous and highly flexible “most significant relationship
principle” (“MSR principle”)2 according to which courts apply the law of
the jurisdiction having “most significant relationship” to the parties and the
event. The exception seems to refer to some form of better-law approach,
condemned no less in choice-of-law literature,3 according to which courts
evaluate the substantive merits of the applied laws. Furthermore, the
combination of the general principle and the exception lacks internal
coherency and consistency.
However, in this Article I argue that the intuitive understanding of
Professor Walker’s teacher was right. Drawing from Kantian legal
philosophy4 and several neo-Kantian writings,5 this Article depicts the main
contours of what I have labeled a Choice-Based Perspective (“CBP”) on
choice-of-law. I argue that CBP provides a truly individual-rights–based
1. Janet Walker, “Are We There Yet?” Towards a New Rule for Choice of Law in Tort, 38
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 331, 332 (2000).
2. See e.g. ALBERT EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 351 (1962)
(mocking the MSR principle as a “meaningless generalization”); Brainerd Currie, Full Faith and Credit
Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congres,s SUP. CT. REV. 89, 95 (1964) (mocking the MSR principle as
showing a “lack of standard”).
3. For extensive criticism pointing to the inherently subjective nature of the best-law approach,
see e.g. Paul H. Neuhaus, Legal Certainty Versus Equity in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 795, 802–07 (1963); O. Kahn-Freund, General Problems of Private International Law, 143
RECUEIL DES COURS 139, 466 (1974).
4. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans & ed..,
1996) (1797) [hereinafter KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT]; Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A
Philosophical Sketch, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS (H.B. Nisbet trans., Hans Reiss ed.,1991) (1795).
5. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB,
THE IDEA]; ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM (2009).
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understanding of the subject that is so lacking in traditional and
contemporary choice-of-law literature. While other accounts have
fundamentally grounded their vision on the principle of states’ sovereignty,
CBP presents a purely private conception of choice-of-law as the union of
the choices of two persons.
Furthermore, I argue that CBP is not detached from reality, but in fact
reflects it. Despite the popular instrumentalist conception of the choice of
law as a tool for promoting states’ interests,6 the normative underpinnings
of CBP are already embedded in many traditional and contemporary
choice-of-law rules, doctrines and concepts of many jurisdictions: (1) the
above-mentioned and vastly popular MSR principle;7 (2) the universally
recognized parties’ autonomy principle;8 (3) the flexible choice-of-law
connecting factors or “starting points” that have been established for each
of the private law categories;9 (4) the central concept of “parties’
reasonable expectations”;10 and (5) the inherent reference, in various
doctrines, to the substantive merits of the involved laws in extreme cases.11
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the notion of
relational choice as an organizing idea of CBP and distinguishes this
notion from the popular sovereignty principle. Part II elaborates on the
three foundational blocks of CBP—(1) the Parties’ Autonomy Principle (2)
the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; and (3) the Innate Right Test of
Legality—and traces their presence in contemporary and traditional choiceof-law rules, doctrines, and concepts. Part III provides several examples of
the operational mechanics of CBP.
I. A FRESH START
It has become axiomatic that the choice-of-law discipline must
somehow be grounded on the organizing principles of the Law of Nations:
states’ sovereignty or states’ relationships.12 This notion appears
throughout the development of choice-of-law thought.13 Choice-of-law
6. See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).]
7. See infra notes 47–58 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.3.
10. See infra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See e.g. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 159–61 (1993).
For a similar argument regarding the centrality of the sovereignty principle for classical and modern
choice-of-law methodologies, see Gerhard Kegel, The Crisis of Conflict of Laws, 112 RECUEIL DES
COURS 95, 184 (1964); Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 278–84
(2008).
13. For a striking example of this type of historical argument, see Alex Mills, The Private History
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theorist have invoked the involvement of a foreign element in a private-law
case as sufficient grounds for insisting on an inherent link between the case
and states’ involvement. This explains why the recent provocative
argument regarding the entire public international law foundation of private
international law has suddenly seemed so reasonable and convincing.14
Take for the example, the two American leading choice-of-law
approaches of the last century: Joseph Beale’s version of the vested rights
theory15 and Brainerd Currie’s interest analysis.16 Grounded on the notion
that choice-of-law is a tool for advancing states’ interests, interest analysis
has inherently linked itself to states’ activities. The same is true with
respect to Beale’s approach. Although it uses the terminology of
“individual rights,” the central components of this theory were ultimately
grounded on the principle of states’ sovereignty.17
CBP, however, offers something completely different. It defends the
conception under which the choice-of-law question is viewed as purely
related to the interaction between litigating parties and as providing the
juridical (as opposed to political) manifestation of this interaction. In this
way, CBP joins the very few commentators who did not take the
sovereignty axiom for granted. Gerhard Kegel18 and Friedrich Juenger19
intuitively challenged the relevance of states’ sovereignty and states’
interests in grasping the nature of choice-of-law question. This strictly
“private” conception of the subject has a rich tradition in the choice-of-law
literature that for years has refused to open the foundations of choice-oflaw process to the principles of the Law of Nations.20
So, if choice-of-law process has nothing to do with states’ sovereignty
and states’ interests, what is choice-of-law about? In a nutshell, the
normative foundation of CBP follows from the title of the discipline
itself—it is about relational choice.
of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (2006).
14. ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
15. JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935). For further discussions on
vested rights theory, see infra notes 17, 91–96 and accompanying text.
16. CURRIE, supra note 6.
17. Thus, Beale insisted on the national conception of the subject according to which the courts
do not apply the foreign law, but recognize the plaintiff’s right under the domestic law. Accordingly,
the foreign law is applied under this conception not as a law, but rather as a “fact” and as such, does not
negate the sovereignty of the forum. BEALE, supra note 15, §5.4, at 53. Furthermore, because of the
sovereignty principle, Beale insisted that the positive law of the country where the last event took place
ultimately determines the question of choice-of-law. Id. §§ 4.12, 8A.1, 8A.6, at 45–47, 58, 62–63.
18. Kegel, supra note 12, at 180, 198.
19. JUENGER, supra note 12, at 159–61.
20. See, e.g., C.M.V.CLARKSON & JONATHAN HILL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (4rd ed. 2011);
ARTHUR NUSSBAUM, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 30 (1943).
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The aspect of choice is derived from the Kantian justification of the
contemporary international order. Kant viewed independent states with
public legal institutions as a necessary reflection of the his organizing
principle of individuals’ freedom.21 Within this order, the question which
framework applies for determining the rightfulness of individuals’ private
interaction (whether purely domestic or international) cannot be determined
by external authority, but rather has to be determined by the individuals
themselves. The idea is that only by allowing individuals to choose the
framework can the contemporary international order fully embody and
cohere with the fundamental Kantian organizing principle of individuals’
freedom.
Consider for example the following set of situations: (1) a contract
signed in North Carolina between two North Carolina businessmen with
respect to delivery of goods in North Carolina; (2) a contract signed in
North Carolina between North Carolina residents with respect to delivery
of goods in the State of New York; and (3) a contract signed in North
Carolina between New York residents with respect to delivery of goods in
California. Given that the court of North Carolina has jurisdiction in these
cases, does it need conceptually to deal with the question of the identity of
the applied law in each one of the cases? CBP’s answer to this question is
“yes.” Although the the foreign element grows more significant in each
successive case, the CBP regards all three cases as involving the choice-oflaw question. The requirement of choice does not depend on the degree of
connectedness to the foreign system; rather, it exists as an independent
normative requirement that is a conceptual precondition to any private-law
litigation. Accordingly, an adjudication of the parties’ contractual claims in
the above-mentioned cases has to be subjected to the preliminary choiceof-law question.22

21. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:230, 6:313]. Therefore, the Kantian justification
of public legal institutions is the reverse of traditional thinking. Their existence is not perceived as an
effective tool for promotion of certain values, but as necessarily following from the organizing principle
of individuals’ freedom. See also RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 8–9, 145–81. For a more detailed
discussion of the Kantian normative justification for contemporary international order, see infra notes
97–105 and accompanying text.
22. Accordingly, CBP reminds somewhat of the argument made by Larry Kramer. Kramer has
challenged the conventional wisdom according to which choice-of-law cases should be distinguished
from purely private law cases by the mere presence of a single foreign element. While using interest
analysis as a point of departure, Kramer argues that no conceptual difference exists between conflicting
plaintiff-defendant arguments regarding the ingredients of say tort law liability and the choice-of-law
question. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 282–83 (1990). By
completely equalizing policy-based analyses of domestic and private international law cases, Kramer
introduced a purely domestic version of choice-of-law. As he claims “[t]he first—and most important—
point to recognize is that moving from wholly domestic cases with multistate contacts does not change
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The nature of the parties’ choice of which framework under which to
adjudicate their private dispute sheds light on the centrality of the states
under CBP. This choice is not abstract; it inherently refers to a specific
territory and, consequently, the specific positive law that governs this
territory. Accordingly, states do not disappear under CBP. The contrary is
true. While they do not play a role in the choice-of-law process itself,
states’ positive-law provisions serve as the object of the parties’ choice. In
this way, CBP recognizes the existence of independent states having
specific territory, territory over which states exercise their sovereign power
in the form of the states’ positive laws.23
The choice is also relational. CBP perceives the choice-of-law
question as not related to a single person’s choice but rather as related to
the unity of two persons’ choices. This conception of the subject rests on
Kantian legal philosophy, which insists on the strictly relational character
of private-law interaction as a relation between two persons, rather than as
a relation between a person and a thing.24 Based precisely on this relational
character of private law, contemporary neo-Kantian scholars have
developed the modern private law categories of contract,25 tort,26 unjust
enrichment27 and the law of property.28 Since CBP insists on a strictly
the essential nature of the interpretive problem.” Id. at 290. Although Kramer’s argument regarding the
inherent presence of the choice-of-law question in purely domestic cases requires an independent
treatment, at first glance, it seems that Kramer confuses the choice-of-law question and the adjudication
process itself. In contrast to Kramer’s approach, CBP purports to explain why the choice-of-law
question always (even in purely domestic private law cases) comes first, before the adjudication
process.
23. This conception of the subject sheds light on one of the perplexing questions of choice-of-law
scholarship: the question of whether there should be a conceptual distinction between interstate cases
within federal systems, such as the United States and Canada, and international interaction. See, e.g.,
Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N. Y. U. L. REV.
719, 729, n.53 (2009); Mathias Reimann, Domestic and International Conflicts Law in the United States
and Western Europe, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 109 (Patrick
J. Borchers & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2001). Since choice-of-law is conceptually viewed as addressing the
question of individuals’ choice with respect to a certain framework to adjudicate their private law
dispute and the states’ sovereignty principle does not play any normative role – there is no conceptual
distinction between federal systems and the general rationale of choice-of-law rules.
24. This conception of private law is fundamentally grounded on the contemporary influential
Neo-Kantian theory of private law of corrective justice, which perceives private law as grounded in the
bipolar structure between the particular plaintiff and particular defendant. See generally WEINRIB, THE
IDEA, supra note 5; JULIUS COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE (2001).
25. See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 5 at 107–45.
26. See generally WEINRIB, THE IDEA, supra note 5, at 101–44.
27. See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The Normative Structure of Unjust Enrichment, in
STRUCTURE AND JUSTIFICATION IN PRIVATE LAW: ESSAYS FOR PETER BIRKS 21 (Charles Rickett and
Ross Grantham eds., 2008); Sagi Peari, Improperly Collected Taxes: The Border between Private and
Public Law, 23 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 125 (2010).
28. See generally RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 86–107.
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“private” conception of choice-of-law, it follows this relational structure of
private interaction. The idea of choice becomes the idea of united choice.29
Part II elaborates on the three foundational blocks of this idea: (1) the
Parties’ Autonomy Principle; (2) the Doctrine of Constructive Inference;
and (3) the Innate Right Test of Legality.
II. THE THREE FOUNDATIONAL BLOCKS OF CBP
A. Parties’ Autonomy Principle
Approaching universal recognition, the so-called parties’ autonomy
principle provides a starting point for CBP analysis of the choice-of-law
question. This principle holds that litigating parties have the ability to
establish the identity of the law applicable for determining their private
rights and duties. In a rare consensus among legal scholars and judicial
decisions, the parties’ autonomy principle has long been accepted in the
area of contract law.30 Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws31 and Article 3 of the European Rome I Regulation32 have
explicitly incorporated this principle. Furthermore, the parties’ autonomy
principle has most recently also received significant recognition in the
areas of tort law and the law of unjust enrichment under Article 14(a) of the
Rome II Regulation.33
Despite the general acceptance of the parties’ autonomy principle in
practice, its theoretical underpinnings remain obscured. More specifically,
the principle has created at least two riddles for traditional positivistic
29. It should be noted that the argument presented in this Article is of limited scope. While
fundamentally relying on corrective justice’s conception of private law, CBP offers an approach for
grasping choice-of-law rules for the basic structures of private interaction (contract, tort, unjust
enrichment, movable property and certain family law interaction) and does not extend its scope to the
instances of different normative structures (such as criminal law), mixed structures (such as cases of
environmental torts or issues related to employers’ compensation), and structures that require an
additional normative argument (such as the case of immovable property).
30. See, e.g., Hessel E. Yntema, Autonomy in Choice-of-Law, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 345–53
(1954); Mathias Reimann, Savigny’s Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 571, 575–77 (1999); Patrick J. Borchers, Categorical Exceptions
to Party Autonomy in Private International Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1646 (2008).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §187 (1971).
32. REGULATION (EC) 593/2008 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 17
JUNE 2008 ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS (ROME I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6
(EU), ART. 3 [hereinafter Rome I Regulation].
33. COMMISSION REGULATION 864/2007, ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NON-CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS (ROME II), art. 14, 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40 (EC), [hereinafter Rome II Regulation]; Mo
Zhang, Party Autonomy in Non-Contractual Obligations: Rome II and Its Impacts on Choice of Law, 39
SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 864 (2009) (calling the parties’ autonomy principle as the “most innovative
part of Rome II”).
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thought.34 First, what is the normative justification of the principle? The
very concept of the sovereign state, whose legislative body enacts positive
law, seems to be at odds with the idea of enabling the parties to determine
themselves the framework that will govern their dispute. Joseph Beale
famously mocked this possibility as no less than “permission to the parties
to do a legislative act.”35 Secondly, why should parties be permitted to
choose a framework that is not the positive law of one of the existing states,
such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts.
The possibility of the application of a non-state norm seems to entail an
even deeper problem for traditional legal positivism, which by its nature is
limited to state-made law.
For CBP, however, the two riddles of legal positivism present no
difficulty. The very nature of the parties’ autonomy principle embodies
CBP’s fundamental idea of the parties’ united choice with respect to the
framework to be applied to resolve their dispute. Thus, the parties’
autonomy principle is a paradigmatic case for CBP and follows CPB’s
normative justification that united choice is always required in private-law
cases. Furthermore, the relational structure of private-law categories which
is presupposed by CBP is consistent with the contemporary tendency to
further extend the parties’ autonomy principle to other private-law
categories, such as tort law, unjust enrichment,36 and family law.37
Kantian philosophy justifies the legislative branch as addressing the
problem of indeterminacy in a hypothetical regime of purely private rights
lacking public legal institutions.38 Yet, under the parties’ autonomy
principle the parties explicitly replace the legislative provision with an
alternative framework despite the theoretical necessity of that framework
for parties’ autonomy, thus introducing the possibility of adopting non-state
provisions. CBP resolves the apparent contradiction: it objects to the
contemporary general tendency to disqualify in advance the possibility of
34. See e.g., Matthias Lehmann, Liberating the Individual from the Battles between States:
Justifying Party Autonomy in Conflict of Laws, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 381, 383 (2008)
(mentioning the “theoretical headaches to any serious positivist” that the parties’ autonomy principle
has caused).
35. BEALE, supra note 15, § 332.1, at 1079.
36. See Rome II Regulation, supra note 33.
37. See e.g., Erik Jayme, Parties Autonomy Principle in International Family Law and
Succession Law: New Tendencies, 11 Y.B. PRIVATE INT’L L. 1 (2009). For further discussion on the
extension of the parties’ autonomy principle to family law from the Neo-Kantian theoretical
perspective, see Sagi Peari, Choice-of-Law in Family Law: Kant, Savigny and the Parties’ Autonomy
Principle, 4 NETH. J. OF PRIVATE INT’L L. 597 (2012).
38. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, at [6:297, 6:313]; see also Ernest Weinrib, Poverty
and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 808-10 (2003) [hereinafter
Weinrib, System of Rights].
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choice of non-state law,39 but at the same time it also imposes a significant
restriction on such choice. Since the parties’ autonomy principle addresses
the problem of indeterminacy in the regime of absence of public legal
institutions, a similar requirement applies with respect to the alternative
framework. Accordingly, for CBP, this alternative framework has to be just
as determinative as a comprehensive state regime. Candidates appearing to
meet this “specificity” requirement include the above-mentioned
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the
Muslim and Jewish comprehensive private-law traditions that have
addressed in great detail a wide range of private interactions.40
While the parties’ autonomy principle is a reflection of choice-of-law
in its purest form, one may inquire as to the relevance of the argument in
the vast majority of cases which lack explicit choice of the parties. The
next section of this Article addresses these cases. Through the introduction
of the Doctrine of Constructive Inference41 and its three constitutive
ingredients—(a) juridical imposition, (b) juridical indicators, and (c)
juridical presuppositions—this section will demonstrate how united choice
is still possible in such cases.

39. For discussion of the difficulty in incorporating non-state norms into the provisions of the
American Second Restatement, and the Rome I and Rome II Regulations, see Katharina Boele-Woelki,
Unifying and Harmonizing Substantive Law and The Role of Conflict of Laws, 340 RECUEIL DES
COURS 275, 401-19 (2010); Giesela Rühl, Party Autonomy in the Private International Law of
Contracts: Transatlantic Convergence and Economic Efficiency, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A
GLOBALIZED WORLD 153, 164-67; Symeon C. Symeonides, Party Autonomy in Rome I and II from a
Comparative Perspective, in CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW –
LIBER AMICORUM KURT SIEHR 513, 539-40 (Katharina Boele-Woelki et al. eds., 2010).
40. For further elaboration on the “specificity requirement” within a concrete example of Jewish
law, see infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. This is not, however, to say that the “specificity
requirement” is the only limitation that CBP imposes on parties’ potential choice. Since the three
foundational blocks of CBP are normatively interconnected, Part III of this Article will demonstrate
further limitations on the parties’ autonomy principle as a result of its relation to the Doctrine of
Constructive Inference (in the form of the “reasonable connection” requirement) and its relation to the
Innate Right Test of Legality (in the form of a substantive restriction on parties’ potential choice). For
discussion of these issues, see infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
41. The term “constructive inference” is borrowed from Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s work on
choice-of-law. See FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND THE
LIMITS OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 202 (William Guthrie trans., 1880)
(1849). On the extensive analysis of this work as a reflection of the complex synthesis and interplay of
natural rights philosophy, Roman law sources, the historical school of jurisprudence and the principal
objection to judicial discretion, see Sagi Peari, Savigny’s Theory of Choice-of-Law as a Principle of
Voluntary Submission, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2014).
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B. The Doctrine of Constructive Inference
1. Juridical Imposition
The Doctrine of Constructive Inference is based on one of the central
notions of Kantian legal philosophy, juridical imposition. Since this
philosophy focuses on the parties’ external actions rather than on subjective
beliefs and wishes, judicial impartiality is crucial. For Kant, the judge
represents a “person that is authorized to impute with rightful force.”42
Accordingly, contemporary neo-Kantian accounts have emphasized the
normative necessity of impartial authority, which provides an external
juridical standpoint to parties’ interactions.43 In the context of CBP, the role
of judicial authority can be stated as follows: by providing juridical
meaning to the parties’ actions, the judge imposes on the parties a united
choice with respect to the positive law governing their private-law
interaction.
In choice-of-law literature, the central concept of “reasonable
expectations of the parties”44 illuminates the notion of juridical imposition.
For example, in the absence of explicit agreement in the area of contract
law, English courts have traditionally imposed on the parties a liability
provision that could be objectively presumed to have been intended by the
parties to govern the contract.45 CBP, however, does not restrict this
concept to the contract-law category. Objectively imposing “reasonable
expectations” on both sides of private-law litigation, CBP reflects the
relational structure of private-law categories as a nexus between the
particular plaintiff and defendant. Accordingly, the “reasonable
expectations” concept flows to the other categories of private law46:
movable property, tort, unjust enrichment, and family law.

42.
43.

KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, at 6:227.
See Ernest J. Weinrib, Two Conceptions of Remedies, in JUSTIFYING PRIVATE LAW
REMEDIES 3, 27 (Charles Rickett ed. 2008); see also Ernest J. Weinrib, Publicness and Private Law, in
1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INTERNATIONAL KANT CONGRESS 191, 192 (H. Robinson & Gordon
Brittan eds., 1995). Many contemporary legal doctrines, such as the objective standard of negligence
law, incorporate the notion of juridical imposition. For discussion of this point, see WEINRIB, THE IDEA,
supra note 5, at 177-83.
44. For an argument regarding the primary centrality of this concept in choice-of-law thought, see
CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 6-7; Peter E. Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties
as a Guide to the Choice of Law in Contract and in Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS 273, 294-96 (1995).
45. See Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A.C. 277 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from N.S.). As Lord Wright states, “the proper law of the contract ‘is the law which the parties intended
to apply’. That intention is objectively ascertained, and, if not expressed, will be presumed from the
terms of the contract and the relevant surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 290; see also ADRIAN BRIGGS,
AGREEMENT ON JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW 429-40 (2008).
46. For an argument in this direction, see Nygh, supra note 44.
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Furthermore, this “parties’ reasonable expectations” concept holds
much more sway in the choice-of-law landscape than one might think. In
particular, it bears clear conceptual similarity to the extremely popular
MSR principle. Under the MSR principle, the courts should seek the law
that reflects the most significant relationship to the given factual situation.
Thus, this principle is stated in the popular47 Second Restatement with
respect to the choice-of-law rule for torts:
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties
under the principles stated in § 6.48

Similarly, the Second Restatement’s choice-of-law rules for contract,49
unjust enrichment,50 movable property,51 and family law52 are formulated in
a substantially identical way. Aside from the subordination to section 6’s
organizing principles, such as Brainerd Currie’s interest analysis53 as well
other considerations,54 CBP willingly adopts these general tort, contract,
unjust enrichment, family law, and property choice-of-law rules. The quest
for the “most significant relationship” signifies precisely the abovepresented notion of juridical imposition, under which united choice is
imposed on the parties through analysis of their external voluntary acts.
Furthermore, the word “occurrence” (or “transaction” in the context of the
contract law category55) relates to the parties, too. Because of the Kantian
relational structure of private-law categories, the “occurrence” represents a
relational aspect of parties’ interaction and inherently links the parties in a
bipolar structure.
It should be noted that the MSR principle is not restricted to the
American legal system; it also has a solid basis in other jurisdictions’
47. On the centrality of the Second Restatement in United States daily choice-of-law practice,
see, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, A New Conflicts Restatement: Why Not?, 5 J. PRIV. INT. L. 383, 393
(2009).
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
49. Id. §§ 188(1), 189-197.
50. Id. § 221(1).
51. Id. §§ 222, 244, 250-251.
52. Id. §§ 154, 283(1), 284, 287(1), 288.
53. Id. § 6(2)(b) (referring to “relevant policies of the forum”) and § 6(2)(c) (referring to the
“relevant policies of other interested states”); Kurt G. Siehr, Domestic Relations in Europe: European
Equivalents to American Evolutions, 30 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 40–46 (1982) (discussing the similarity
between § 6 and Currie’s interest analysis).
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2).
55. See id. § 188.
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choice-of-law traditions. For example, the default rule of Article 12 (2) of
the now-abolished Private International Law Act56 referred to the
“significance of factors”57 in the tort law area. Similarly, the general rule of
Article 4(3) of the Rome II Regulation refers to “all the circumstances of
the case [indicating] that the tort/delict is manifestly more closely
connected” with respect to the tort law and unjust enrichment categories.58
What is, however, the operational mechanism of the Doctrine of
Constructive Inference? The notions of juridical indicators and juridical
presuppositions are accessory tools of the doctrine, which facilitate its
operation. The following two sections elaborate on this matter.
2. Juridical Indicators
Any external action of the parties can be considered a legitimate
indicator of the parties’ united choice. Connecting factors such as the
parties’ habitual residence,59 the place of injury,60 the place of
contracting,61 the place of performance,62 the place of the business,63 the
place of enrichment,64 or even nationality,65 are all potentially relevant to
the parties’ united choice with respect to the law to be applied to their
dispute. By always referring to the factors that affect both the plaintiff and
the defendant, the Second Restatement incorporates a strictly interpersonal
conception of the private-law categories: tort, contract, movable property,
unjust enrichment and family law. I label these connecting factors juridical
indicators. The contemporary international order comprised of sovereign
states with defined territories explains the territorial nature of juridical
56. Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995, c. 42 (U.K.) [hereinafter PIL
Act].
57. The unlimited list of these factors included “factors relating to the parties, to any of the events
which constitute the tort or delict in question or any of the circumstances or consequences of those
events.
Id. § 12(2).
58. Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, art. 4(3). See generally Richard Fentiman, The
Significance of Close Connection, in THE ROME II REGULATION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO NONCONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS 85 (John Ahern & William Binchy eds., 2009).
59. Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, arts. 4(2), 10(2). For views supporting the concept of
domicile as ultimately grounded on a person’s choice, see e.g., CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 112—15 (G.R. Gillespie trans., 2d ed.1889); JOHN
WESTLAKE, TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 304 (1859).
60. Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, art. 4(1); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 145(2)(a); PIL Act, supra note 56, art. 11(2)(a).
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2)(a).
62. Id. § 188(2)(c).
63. Id. §§ 145(2)(c),188(2)(e).
64. Id. § 221(2)(c); Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, art. 10(3).
65. Id. §§ 145(2)(c), 188(2)(e).
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indicators. Since each territory is governed by its respective positive laws,
the choice of a territory becomes a choice of positive law.66
The inherent territorial nature of juridical indicators explains why
CBP unequivocally rejects the conceptual distinction in choice-of-law
literature and judicial decisions between so-called “territoriality factors”
(which refer to such factors as place of transaction and place of injury) and
“personality factors” (which refer to such factors as domicile and place of
business).67 The events comprising the structures of private-law categories
(such as injury, wrong, transaction, or enrichment) mimic the strictly
relational character of private-law interaction. In this way, the connecting
factors from the “territoriality” category link themselves to the parties, and
together with connecting factors from the “personality” category, they
constitute the pool of juridical indicators. These juridical indicators enable
judicial authority to ascertain the parties’ united choice with respect to a
specific territory and its positive law. In other words, both categories—
”territorial” and “personality”—are in fact territorial;68 they simply
represent different sides of the same coin of the normative structure of
choice-of-law.69
This unified normative basis of connecting factors also answers the
criticism of the MSR principle’s flexibility. Since this principle counts and
weighs connecting factors, it has been accused of causing the great
66. This notion of the inherently territorial nature of juridical indicators sheds light on the place
of “nationality” connecting factor within the CBP. This connecting factor, being inherently related to a
state’s activity and the notion of citizenship, plays a much less central role for CBP than the territorial
factors. Accordingly, it would be normatively relevant only to the extent it indicates the identity of the
framework that the persons chose to adjudicate their dispute.
67. See generally SYMEON C.SYMEONIDES, THE AMERICAN CHOICE-OF-LAW REVOLUTION:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 123—140 (2006) [hereinafter SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION]; Symeon C.
Symeonides, Territoriality and Personality in Tort Conflicts, in INTERCONTINENTAL COOPERATION
THROUGH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF PETER E. NYGH 401 (Talia Einhorn
& Kurt Siehr eds., 2004).
68. For somewhat related comments on the “territoriality”/”personality” distinction, see Ralf
Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savigny’s Private International Law and the Challenge
from Europeanization and Globalization, in AKTUELLE FRAGEN ZU POLITISCHER UND RECHTLICHER
STEUERUNG IM KONTEXT DER GLOBALISIERUNG 119, 134 (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds.,
2007); Reimann, supra note 30 at 590.
69. Accordingly, CBP is at odds with William Reppy’s principal objection to different
combinations between methods of (1) “territoriality”, (2) “personality” and (2) “better law”. Reppy
labels this combination of methods as “eclecticism”. See generally William A. Reppy. Jr., Eclecticism
in Methods for Resolving Tort and Contract Conflict of Laws: The United States and the European
Union, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2053 (2008). Ironically, but as a combination of the three methods, CBP
generally supports this “eclecticism”. Under this approach the “territoriality” and “personality”
categories are normatively unified. Furthermore, as we will see in the next section of this Article, under
the notion of the Innate Right Test of Legality, a restricted version of the “better law” theory is
integrated into the normative structure of the choice-of-law question.
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unpredictability of the Second Restatement in its implementation.70 The
MSR principle has been mocked as being a “no rules approach”71 or
“unabashedly open-ended.”72 As Friedrich Juenger sarcastically put it, “But
even a juggler, not to mention a trial judge, can only cope with a finite
number of balls in the air.”73 The above-presented account of juridical
indicators sheds light on this objection. Any external action of the parties
can be considered a legitimate indicator with respect to the juridical
meaning of the interaction. Accordingly, the flexibility of the MSR
principle reflects its normative significance, rather than any doctrinal
deficiency.
Furthermore, the matter of the flexibility of the MSR principle
deserves special attention for CBP. Although this perspective does not
restrict the potential pool of juridical indicators, it is crucial for CBP that
all indicators be directly related to the private law structures of liability.
This requirement is based on the very relational nature of the notion of
united choice as a fundamental principle of the choice-of-law question.
This choice is about a framework that will determine parties’ rights and
duties with respect to certain private-law categories: contract, tort, unjust
enrichment, movable property, family law. Accordingly, choice has to be
related to these categories. Thus, for example, in the case of tort law, the
indicators of the parties’ domicile, the place of permanent business, and so
on, have to be assessed at the time of the tort. Accordingly, the indicator of
the place of the forum, for instance, offered by some commentators,74 must
be rejected as normatively defective because it bears no relation to the tort
that forms the party’s interaction.
Indeed, due to the potential multiplicity of relevant juridical
indicators, the process of providing juridical meaning to the parties’
external actions is not an easy one.75 The era of the Internet and people’s
70. See e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, “At Least, To Do No Harm”: Does the Second Restatement of
Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284, 1288-89 (1997); Kermit Roosevelt III,
The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2466. For a recent objection
to the alleged unpredictability of the Second Restatement, see Whytock, supra note 23, at 745-76.
71. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80
HARV. L. REV. 377, 381 (1966).
72. Laura E. Little, Hairsplitting and Complexity in Conflict of Laws: The Paradox of Formalism,
37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 925, 958 (2004).
73. Friedrich K. Juenger, The E.E.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations: An American Assessment, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS 295, 300 (P.M. North ed., 1982).
74. See e.g., CURRIE, supra note 6, at 141. For a related discussion, albeit in the context of
jurisdictional rules, see Mills, supra note 14 at 237 (distinguishing between the “time of proceedings”
and the “time of event related to the dispute”).
75. For examples of the operational mechanics of juridical indicators, see WEINRIB, supra note
27, at 34-43; Peari, supra note 27, at 154-61.
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increased mobility add much complexity to this task. However, hard cases
will always remain hard cases.76 All relevant juridical indicators must be
taken into consideration and systematically evaluated in accordance with
their juridical significance. As the Second Restatement states: “These
contacts [juridical indicators] are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.”77
Furthermore, for the CBP of choice-of-law, juridical indicators are
not the beginning of the story. The next section presents the other accessory
tool in the operational mechanism of the Doctrine of Constructive
Inference—the notion of juridical presuppositions.
3. Juridical Presuppositions
By analyzing the internal structures of each of the private-law
categories, CBP purports to deduce a connecting factor that is presumed to
reflect the parties’ united choice of law for adjudicating their private-law
interaction. This connecting factor serves for CBP as a starting point for
further evaluation of juridical indicators. I label these categories’ structural
points of departure “juridical presuppositions.”
Let me demonstrate this argument through the category of contract
law. As with other private-law categories, the Kantian legal philosophy
conceives of this category as strictly relational, that is, as a relation
between two persons.78 Within this relation, the Kantian conception of the
76. Savigny many years ago recognized the great complexity of certain situations. Thus, he calls
the case of a contract concluded by correspondence as a “most doubtful and disputed case”. SAVIGNY,
supra note 41, at 230.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(2), 188(2), 221(2). This exposition
of the flexible nature of juridical indicators pre-empts the possibility of challenging CBP based on the
objections that have been raised by Lea Brilmayer against the notion of tacit consent. By invoking the
case of a person’s accidental physical presence in a state’s territory, Brilmayer has reached the
conclusion that the notion of tacit consent cannot be perceived as a consensual submission. Lea
Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1989) [hereinafter Brilmayer,
Consent]; Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice-of-law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1304 (1989)
[hereinafter Brilmayer, Rights]). Accordingly, Brilmayer mocks the doctrine of tacit consent as “purely
fictional” and declares it to be not applicable to the choice-of-law question. Id. at 1303. This objection,
however, fails to undermine CBP’s notion of juridical indicators. Indeed, the circumstances in which a
person’s domicile does not shed light on a person’s choice do exist, but they are simply irrelevant for
CBP’s notion of juridical indicators, which by its nature integrates a broad spectrum of relevant factors
that are evaluated according to their relative significance. Furthermore, the notion of juridical indicators
is also immune from the “fiction” charge. In fact, this is exactly CBP’s understanding of the abovepresented Doctrine of Constructive Inference according to which the judge imposes on the parties the
juridical meaning of their voluntary external actions. This is indeed fiction, but as Brilmayer herself
admits elsewhere, this is a legal fiction. See Brilmayer, Consent, supra, at 7 (emphasis not in original).
For discussion of the central role of “legal fictions” under the Neo-Kantian theory of private law, see
WEINRIB, THE IDEA, supra note 5, at 177-96.
78. For an alternative conception of contractual entitlement as a relation between a person and
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nature of contractual entitlement inherently focuses on the performance of
the contract. Under this conception, by signing a contract, a person does not
acquire a right to the item bargained for, but rather acquires a right merely
to the performance of the promised act.79 Thus, for example, if I agree with
my neighbor to buy his horse, the signing of the contract itself does not
mean that the horse is already mine. By making a contract with my
neighbor I acquire merely a right to require my neighbor to perform his
obligation—to deliver the horse. However, the horse continues to belong to
my neighbor until the actual performance of the obligation—the actual
transfer of the horse to me.80
Since the property transfer occurs not at the time of signing a contract,
but rather at the time of performance itself, this concept of contractual
entitlement shifts the focus from the act of signing the contract, to
performance of the contract itself, as the essential element of this privatelaw category. In this way, the place of performance, localized at this
essential element, establishes a juridical presupposition for ascertaining the
parties’ united choice. However, the place of performance provides only
the starting point for judicial analysis, and other juridical indicators such as
place of business, domicile, place of contracting, presumed doctrine of
validity of contract,81 and so forth have to be considered and balanced.82
The same point follows from a neo-Kantian analysis of other privatelaw categories. Thus, by focusing on the concept of transition of value, the
neo-Kantian understanding of the law of unjust enrichment points to the

thing, see the Hegelian conception of contract law as a relation between the person and thing. G.W.F.
HEGEL, OUTLINES OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 84-92 (T.M. Knox, trans. 2008) (1952). See also
Peter Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel
and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989).
79. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, at [6:273]. For a detailed discussion of the
Kantian exposition of contractual entitlement with further important implications for the nature of
contractual damages, see Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement as Contract Remedies, 78
CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 55, 65-70 (2003); RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 69-70.
80. As Weinrib explains “[W]hat the promisee acquires through a contract is not a right to a thing
but a right against the specific person obligated to perform the requisite act.” Weinrib, supra note 79, at
67 (reference omitted).
81. For an exposition of the presumed validity of contract doctrine as fundamentally related to the
parties’ presumed choice (and therefore fully consistent with CBP), see Nygh, supra note 44, at 338-40.
82. This approach seemed to be mentioned in a footnote by the translator of Savigny’s work on
choice-of-law, William Guthrie, who introduced the traditional English contract choice-of-law rule in
the following terms: “No doubt there are cases where the place of contracting is of importance, but
generally the place of performing is of more.” This statement seems to accept the place of fulfillment of
the contractual obligation as a juridical presupposition, but it does not disqualify in advance the
significance of the place of contracting as a relevant juridical indicator. See SAVIGNY, supra note 41, at
228 (emphasis not in original).
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place of enrichment as the juridical presupposition of this category.83
Similar analyses of the movable property and tort law categories
establishes the juridical presuppositions of the place of property and the
place of the wrongful conduct,84 respectively, as the most central elements
in the internal structures of these private-law categories. Under this
exposition of the relationships between juridical presuppositions and
juridical indicators, juridical presuppositions are not “fixed,” but rather
present “loose” starting positions that can be overturned by the relevant
juridical indicators of the particular circumstances.85
The relation proposed here between juridical presuppositions and
juridical indicators can also be traced in contemporary choice-of-law
provisions and judicial decisions. Among them the following examples can
be mentioned: the traditional common law approach that has viewed the
place of enrichment as a point of departure for choice-of-law analysis of
the law of unjust enrichment,86 the preliminary tort choice-of-law rule
under the abolished PIL Act,87 the preliminary tort and unjust enrichment
choice-of-law rules of the Rome II Regulation,88 and various provisions of
the Second Restatement.89
Furthermore, the notions of juridical presuppositions and juridical
indicators also insulate CBP from the objections raised by legal realists
against Joseph Beale’s version of “vested rights” theory, which was
eventually destroyed by those objections.90 CBP seems to obstruct at least

83. Weinrib, supra note 27; Peari, supra note 27.
84. CBP supports the juridical presupposition of the place of wrongful conduct (rather than the
place of injury) as the most central element of the structure of tort law. For the central role of the
wrongful conduct element within Neo-Kantian conceptions of tort law structures of liability, see Arthur
Ripstein, Civil Recourse and Separation of Wrongs and Remedies, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 163 (2012);
WEINRIB, THE IDEA, supra note 5, at 38-40, 143-203.
85. This was precisely Joachim Zekoll’s response to Juenger’s criticism of the apparently
inherent flexibility of the MSR principle. Zekoll argues that Juenger’s argument ignores the rooted
European and American tradition of so-called “soft connecting factors” that can be overturned by other
connecting factors. See Joachim Zekoll, A Review of Choice of Law and Multistate Justice, in
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE THIRD MILLENNIUM 9, 14 (Patrick J. Borchers & Joachim
Zekoll eds., 2001).
86. See e.g., George Panagopoulos, RESTITUTION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 111-31
(2000); see also Robert Leslie, Unjustified Enrichment in the Conflict of Law, 2 EDIN. L.R. 233, 235-41
(defending the unjust enrichment choice-of-law rule that combines the place of enrichment and the
MSR principle).
87. PIL Act, supra note 56, art. 11(1).
88. Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, arts. 4(1); 10(3).
89. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (establishing a preliminary
point of departure in the area of tort law); id. § 191 (establishing a preliminary point of departure in the
area of contract law).
90. For a discussion of the realists’ exceptionally successful attack on Beale’s version of vested
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two (out of three91) of the realists’ principal objections. First, CBP is
immune from the so-called “mechanical” or “arbitrary” claim of Beale’s
theory. The legal realists criticized the “mechanical method” of this theory
under which choice-of-law follows strictly the application of the single
connecting factor of the last event.92 On the contrary, there is nothing
mechanical or arbitrary in CBP. It does not strictly follow the application of
a pre-determined (and often arbitrary) connecting factor of vested rights
theory, but rather involves a complex adjudicative process of analyzing and
weighing the relevant juridical presupposition and juridical indicators.
Second, CBP is also immune from the legal realists’ other claim,
which challenged the coherency of Beale’s argument. The realists have
demonstrated the flawed internal logic in the vested rights theory’s view of
the court as a mere enforcer of a pre-existing right of the plaintiff.93 CBP’s
conception of the choice-of-law question, on the contrary, actually follows
the realists in holding that the plaintiff’s right does not exist until it is
promulgated by the court.94 As we have seen, the state does not disappear
under CBP.95 CBP inherently assigns to the state’s public institution,
judicial authority, a crucial role through which the court systematically
evaluates persons’ external voluntary acts and gives them juridical
meaning. In contrast to Beale, who viewed judges as bureaucrats enforcing
the law of the last event,96 for CBP, the plaintiff’s right cannot exist
without public judicial authority.

rights theory, see SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 67, at 11-13; Brilmayer, Rights, supra note
77, at 1281-91.
91. The legal realists’ third objection challenged in principle any conceptual understanding of the
choice-of-law question. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 4, 8, 15 (1942); see also ERNEST G. LORENZEN, SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1947).
92. Thus, Cook coined Beale’s last event connecting factor as a ‘practical rule’ (COOK, supra note
91, at 45) and mocked the arbitrary connecting factor of the place of injury in the tort law category (Ibid
at 17, 203). For related objections to vested rights theory, see CURRIE, supra note 6, at 138-39
(mentioning the ‘machinery’ operation of this theory).
93. See COOK, supra note 91, at 20-25. For a recent restatement of this argument, see Kermit
Roosevelt, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence By Means of Language, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1821, 1830-36 (2004).
94. COOK, supra note 91, at 29-33.
95. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
96. BEALE, supra note 15, § 4.6, at 38-39. As Perry Dane commented on the role of judicial
authority under Beale’s theory the distinctiveness of Beale’s approach according to which rights are
created under the time of the occurrence of facts rather than the rights created at the time of litigation.
See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1191, 1195 (1987)
(footnotes omitted).
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C. Innate Right Test of Legality
The exposition of the CBP of choice-of-law is not complete without
its final foundational block. This block addresses the Kantian justification
for the positivity of laws and the resulting substantive restriction on that
positivity.
The Kantian position on this matter can be stated as follows: within
the regime of purely private rights called the “State of Nature”, Kant makes
a conceptual division between two types of individual rights: the “Innate
Right” and “Acquired Rights”. The Innate Right is the inherent entitlement
that every person has by virtue of his birth.97 Innate equality, the
presumption of innocence, freedom of expression, and freedom of belief
are among the constituents of this right that Kant specifies. Acquired
Rights, on the other hand, refer to an individual’s capacity to acquire
objects external to them.98 Property rights and contractual rights are
representative examples of such rights.
In contrast to the Innate Right, the normative structures of Acquired
Rights are so obscure and indeterminate that they are perceived as
provisional, rather than conclusive, in nature.99 This provisional nature of
Acquired Rights leads to the imperative to leave the regime of purely
private rights in favor of establishing sovereign states and public legal
institutions that will guarantee the regime of property entitlements (or, as
Kant refers to it, the “Rightful Condition”).100 In this way, the public legal
institutions that create law (the legislative branch), apply law (the judicial
branch), and enforce law (the executive branch) are ultimately justified by
the indeterminacy of Acquired Rights in the State of Nature.101

97. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:237-6:238].
98. Id. [6:245-6:6:252]. Accordingly, the Kantian concept of Acquired Rights should not be
confused with the terminologically identical concept of “acquired rights” that is frequently used in
choice-of-law literature in the context of rights “acquired” under foreign laws that domestic courts
enforce. Since Kantian Acquired Rights relate to the rights that the individuals have with respect to
objects external to them in the regime of purely private rights, they have nothing to do with the
existence of sovereign states and enforcement of their positive law provisions in domestic courts.
99. For accounts supporting this understanding of the contrast between Innate Right and Acquired
Rights, see Weinrib, System of Rights, supra note 38, at 808; RIPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 177.
100. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:313].
101. Accordingly, these basic features of the Kantian concept of the State of Nature would be at
odds with two recent attempts to base the “Neo-Kantian” understanding of choice-of-law on the
extension of the State of Nature concept to private international interaction. See Gian Paolo Romano, Le
Droit International Privé à l’épreuve de la Théorie Kantienne de la Justice, 1 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 59 (2012); Florian Rödl, Weltbürgerliches Kollisionsrecht, ÜBER DIE FORM DES
KOLLISIONSRECHTS UND SEINE GESTALT IM RECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION (2008). In contrast to
these accounts, the Kantian State of Nature fundamentally addresses the regime of natural Acquired
Rights with a further transition to the regime of international order consisting of independent states with
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Because the imperative to leave the State of Nature in favor of the
Rightful Condition is imperative, Kant supports a minimal model of the
states’ order.102 In this model, all states with their public institutions have to
be viewed equally, regardless of their internal approximation towards the
Kantian ideal of a republican state.103 Therefore, no distinction is made
between the positive-law provisions of liberal democratic states and
corrupted states that do not even have a clear separation of powers. Since
for Kant all positive laws are normatively equal, no additional inquiry is
needed to decide whether a given law is more or less approximate to Kant’s
natural rights theory.
Had it stopped at this point, this account would have collapsed into the
classical positivist approach according to which legality is grounded solely
on the authoritative act of appropriate authority. However, this is not the
Kantian view. In fundamental contrast to the classical positivist approach,
Kant provides a normative justification for the laws’ positivity. The
motivation behind the imperative to establish modern states with their legal
public institutions was driven by the defects in the State of Nature.
However, these defects are related to Acquired Rights, not to the Innate
Right. This explains why the Innate Right survives the transition to the
Rightful Condition and why a legislative provision that does not respect the
Innate Right is not a positive provision at all.104 In other words, for Kant,
all positive laws are normatively equal, subject to passing the fundamental
precondition of the Innate Right Test of Legality [“IRTL”].105
public legal institutions.
102. Kant seems to identify certain extreme situations in which the individuals did not even enter
into the Rightful Condition. Accordingly the most horrible and barbaric regimes cannot, for Kant, be
regarded as states. See IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW [7:330]
(Robert Louden trans., 2006) (1798).
103. KANT, DOCTRINE OF RIGHT, supra note 4, [6:340- 6:341]; see Garrett W. Brown, State
Sovereignty, Federation and Kantian Cosmopolitanism, 11 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 495, 505 (2005)
104. For a natural law tradition that supports this position under which highly unjust positive
provisions cannot be counted as “law”, see Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and SupraStatutory Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (Bonne Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans.,
2006) (1946); Gustav Radbruch, Five Minutes of Legal Philosophy, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 13
(Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson trans., 2006) (1945); ROBERT ALEXY, THE
ARGUMENT FROM INJUSTICE: A REPLY TO LEGAL POSITIVISM (Stanley L. Paulson & Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson trans., 2002); SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 23, n.23 (2011).
105. The argument in this and the previous three paragraphs is drawn from my interpretation of
Kantian legal positivism. This understanding differs from the well-known Jeremy Waldron treatment of
this issue, Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism,109 HARV. L. REV. 1535 (1996); JEREMY
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999), where Waldron attributes to Kant the classical positivist
position according to which the fundamental test of legality is solely grounded on the authoritative act
of appropriate authority. My view is different. If anything, this view relates to Perry Dane’s recent
comments regarding the possible relation between normativity, positivity and choice-of-law, where
Dane seems to argue that natural law provides at the same time a basis for both: (1) justification of legal
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In modern choice-of-law terminology, the IRTL (which is
subsequently important for the private international law component of
“equal treatment”106) can be traced across a wide spectrum of subjects,
doctrines, and concepts appearing in choice-of-law literature under
different names: “limitations on the parties’ autonomy principle,”107 the
“public policy exception,”108 the “fundamental public policy exception,”109
“mandatory rules,”110 “rules of immediate application,”111 “human
rights,”112 “supranational human rights,”113 or “constitutional
constraints.”114 Despite the myriad names, the CBP insists on a single
unifying basis for understanding these subjects, doctrines, and concepts.115
Under this understanding, the IRTL inheres in the choice-of-law process
itself and provides the ultimate normative justification for the wide range of

positivism; and (2) an exception to legal positivism in radically “unjust” cases. See Perry Dane, The
Natural Law Challenge to Choice of Law, in THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 142, 170-75
(Donald E. Childress ed., 2012).
106. See, e.g., R.H. Graveson, Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws, 78 LAW Q.
REV. 337, 361 (1962); Elliott E. Cheatham & Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 963 (1952); Roosevelt, supra note 71, at 2517 (“equality of treatment under
conflict rules is clearly fundamental”). Accordingly the whole methodology of interest analysis seems
to be ruled out by CBP as inherently discriminatory against non-residents. For discussion on this feature
of interest analysis, see Roosevelt, supra note 70, at 2481, 2500; Brilmayer, Rights, supra note 77, at
1315.
107. Both American and European systems tend to intervene in the parties’ choice under the
parties’ autonomy principle in the case of inherently asymmetrical relationships between the parties.
Among these special provisions are mandatory consumer, employment and insurance contract
requirements, see Rühl, supra note 39, at 167–175; Borchers, supra note 30, at 1657–59 and the weaker
party protection provisions of ex-ante agreements in the area of tort law under the Rome II Regulation,
see Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, Art. 14(1)(b).
108. Accordingly, CBP conceives the doctrine of public policy as an establishment of a minimal
substantive threshold for the ordinary choice-of-law process, which is unrelated to any particular
policy-based analysis of a particular state. For conceptions of public policy doctrine formulated in
somewhat related terms, see JUENGER, supra note 12, at 199 (coining the doctrine as of “last resort”);
Cheatham & Reese, supra note 106, at 980 (referring to the doctrine as “dragging on the coat tails of
civilization”).
109. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 30, at 1652.
110. Id. at 1651–57; Rome II Regulation, supra note 33, Art. 16.
111. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, American Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century,
37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 33–34 (2000) (defining “rules of immediate application” as “substantive
rules of law which are intended to apply to multistate cases ‘immediately’ or ‘directly’ in the sense of
bypassing the ordinary choice-of-law rules”).
112. See, e.g., Adrian Briggs, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 232 (2nd ed. 2008).
113. Ralf Michaels, Public and Private International Law: German Views on Global Issues, J.
PRIVATE INT’L. L. 121, 131 (2008) [hereinafter Michaels, German Views]. For further discussion on the
notion of human rights as a reflection of IRTL, see infra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
114. Roosevelt, supra note 70, at 2507–34.
115. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 30, at 1651–52 (substantially equating the American use of the
term “public policy” and the European term “mandatory rules”).
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exceptions to the application of choice-of-law rules. The authoritative acts
of those states that do not meet the substantive requirement of Kantian
Innate Right are disqualified from this process and cannot in principle serve
as an object of persons’ united choice.
III. THE OPERATIONAL FORCE OF CBP: SEVERAL EXAMPLES
I would like to demonstrate the operational force of CBP through
several examples. Consider the following situation. If my neighbor and I
were to have a dispute about whether I should compensate him or her for
the full cost of our shared fence that he or she just built, could we agree that
the dispute between us would be governed by the applicable Jewish law
provision of unjust enrichment rather than the alternative state law
provision? In other words, can we, in contract law, tort law, unjust
enrichment, family law, or property law cases, provide our own,
autonomous and non-state substantive framework for deciding our
disputes?
CBP would treat the case in the following manner. Jewish law offers
coherent and comprehensive conceptions of the law of unjust enrichment in
general, and the matter of shared fences in particular, which in some ways
relates to, and in other ways departs from, the contemporary common law
understanding of the subject.116 Accordingly, it meets the above-mentioned
“specificity requirement” that CBP imposes on the parties’ autonomy
principle.117 Furthermore, since the three foundational blocks of CBP
together always influence the choice-of-law process and operate to
different degrees and on different levels depending on the particular
circumstances of the case, CBP imposes several additional restrictions on
the parties’ potential choice. The IRTL imposes on the choice-of-law
process the value of “equality” according to which individuals are treated
equally before the law regardless of race, gender, religion, and so on.
Accordingly, CBP would disqualify the application of a Jewish law
provision of unjust enrichment that would grant a certain advantage to my
neighbor merely because he is not Jewish or because of his gender.118
Furthermore, the influence of the Doctrine of Constructive Inference and

116. For a helpful discussion of these issues, see, Ernest J. Weinrib, Planting Another’s Field:
Unrequested Improvements Under Jewish Law, in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 221 (Jason
Neyers, Mitchell McInnes & Stephen G.A. Pitel eds., 2004).
117. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
118. On the discriminatory nature of Jewish law private law provisions against foreigners, see
David Wermuth, Human Rights in Jewish Law: Contemporary Juristic and Rabbinic Conceptions, 32
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1101 (2011). For an attempt to reconcile Jewish law discriminatory provisions in light
of contemporary reality, see HAIM H. COHN, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JEWISH LAW (1984).
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the MSR principle gives rise to an additional limitation: this choice of
Jewish law has to be to a certain degree objectively related to the parties. In
this way CBP follows contemporary American doctrines limiting the
parties´ autonomy principle: (1) the requirement of certain reasonable
connection of the parties to the chosen law; and (2) the exception of
vulnerable party cases, such as consumer and employee contracts.119
The other two examples are from perhaps the most significant tort law
choice-of-law decisions of the last century: the American Babcock v.
Jackson120 and English Chaplin v. Boys.121 Babcock v. Jackson involved a
tort between two New York residents during their short trip to Ontario.
Despite CBP’s juridical presupposition to apply the law of the place he
place of wrongful conduct, an analysis of all the other juridical indicators
pointed to the juridical imposition of New York’s negligence law as
reflecting the parties’ united choice with respect to the framework for
determination of their rights and duties. At this point, the question of the
so-called reverse-Babcock case arises, in which an accident occurs in New
York between Ontario residents. Apparently, a similar MSR analysis
purports to support the application of Ontario’s negligence law. However,
this would ignore the IRTL. Since Ontario’s negligence law of that time
discriminated against foreign residents in favor of local residents,122 this
law infringes the equality of the parties and consequently is inconsistent
with the IRTL. Therefore, despite the fact that juridical indicators pointed to
Ontario’s law, the substantive evaluation of this law disqualifies it from the
pool of legitimate provisions from which the parties’ united choice can be
inferred. From this perspective, the application of the New York negligence
law remains in the reverse-Babcock case.
On the other hand, Chaplin v. Boys represents a case where the
content of the applied law passes the IRTL. In this case, a tort had been
committed between two English soldiers during their military service in
Malta. Despite the juridical presupposition of the place of wrongful
conduct, the juridical indicators of the parties’ permanent domiciles and the
119. For a recent discussion of the two limitations that American doctrine imposes on the parties’
autonomy principle, see Rühl, supra note 39, at 155-176, and Symeonides, supra note 39.
120. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473 (1963). For a discussion on the influence that this case
has exercised on American choice-of-law thinking, see SYMEONIDES, REVOLUTION, supra note 68, at
106-114.
121. Chaplin v. Boys [1971] A.C. 356. For a discussion on the significance of this case for English
tort choice-of-law rules, see CLARKSON & HILL, supra note 20, at 292 (“The common law choice of law
rules comprise a general rule and an exception. The leading authority is the decision of the House of
Lords in Boys v. Chaplin.”).
122. For a discussion on this point see Donald T. Trautman, A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 465
(1967), and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 133 (1972) (Bergan, J., dissenting).
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arbitrary nature of the place of military service123 point to the application of
English negligence law. However, in contrast to Babcock v. Jackson, both
of the relevant positive provisions in this case pass the IRTL. Although,
according to the House of Lords’ opinion, the Maltese law clearly
undercompensated the plaintiff,124 this fact is irrelevant for the IRTL. As
long as the equality between the parties is preserved, the CBP treats both
positive law provisions equally, regardless of their approximation to
Kantian natural law philosophy. Accordingly, in the reverse-Chaplin case
(where a tort had been committed between two Maltese servants during
their service in England) the Maltese tort law would apply.125
The last example I would like to refer to is the well-known notion of
international human rights as a reflection of IRTL. The IRTL sheds light on
the conceptual location of this notion. Recognized in a series of
international conventions,126 the universalistic aspirations of human rights
have acquired a significant role in contemporary legal scholarship.127
Through the notion of the IRTL and its independence from Law of Nation
considerations,128 CBP rejects any relation to public international law or
international relationships. Therefore, despite the current tendency of
academic literature,129 CBP perceives international human rights as an
inherently internal component of the choice-of-law process itself. This
“private international law” classification of international human rights has a
direct influence on several related matters. First, CBP denies the common
123. See SAVIGNY, supra note 41, at 103-104 (eliminating the discussion on the arbitrary nature of
military service as vitiating a person’s choice with respect to the identity of the applied law).
124. Chaplin, [1971] A.C. 356 at 380 (Lord Guest), 373 (Lord Hodson), 384 (Lord Wilberforce),
393 (Lord Pearson).
125. This point demonstrates the conceptual differences between CBP and a purely better-law
methodology. While best-law methodology is based purely on the substantive evaluation of the content
of relevant positive provisions, the CBP rejects an overall appeal to the notion of substantive justice and
restricts this evaluation to the IRTL.
126. See Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Dec. 10 1948. G.A. Res. 217 A (III);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Sept. 3, 1981, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13;
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
127. See e.g., JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9-27 (2nd
ed. 2002); Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 201,
206-208 (1998) (discussing the natural law foundation of human rights); Michael J. Perry, Are Human
Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and Related Matters, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 461 (1997)
(defending a universalistic conception of human rights against the subjectivism of cultural relativism).
128. See supra Part I.
129. For an example of the protection of international human rights in public international law, see
JOHN H. CURRIE, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 412-448 (2nd ed. 2008); see also Michaels, German
Views, supra note 114, at 133 (“Today, the site of human rights is usually sought in treaties between
nations; this is what justifies their character as public international law.”).
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view that private international law and public international law are linked
through the subject of international human rights.130 Second, it rejects the
instrumentalist conception of the choice-of-law question according to
which choice-of-law serves as a tool for promoting human rights.131 On the
contrary, CBP defends an internal justification of the choice-of-law
question and as such it is purely non-instrumental. Finally, CBP rejects the
notion that the choice-of-law question can be grounded solely on
international human rights.132 This would disjoin the IRTL from other
foundational blocks of CBP. Although the IRTL is not a normatively
disconnected exception to the choice-of-law process (as it is viewed in
current choice-of-law literature), it also is not the sole organizing principle
of choice-of-law. Rather, under CBP, the subject of international human
rights (as the actualization of the IRTL) is an indispensable part of the
normative ensemble that consists of: (1) the Parties’ Autonomy Principle;
(2) the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; and (3) IRTL.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented the Choice-Based Perspective of choice-oflaw. Starting with the notion of the independence of the choice-of-law
process from the principles of the Law of Nations, it argued that the choiceof-law question is ultimately grounded on the idea of persons’ united
choice with respect to the framework for adjudication of their dispute. This
idea has been developed through three foundational blocks: (1) the Parties’
Autonomy Principle; (2) the Doctrine of Constructive Inference; and (3) the
Innate Right Test of Legality. Furthermore, as it has been shown, the
normative underpinnings of CBP are fully consistent with many traditional
and contemporary choice-of-law rules, doctrines, and concepts.

130. See e.g., Michaels, German Views, supra note 114, at 131.
131. See e.g., Veerle Van Den Eecklhout, Promoting Human Rights within the Union: The Role of
Private International Law, 14 ELJ 105, 111-113, 117-118 (2008).
132. See e.g., Ralf Michaels, The New European Choice-of-Law Revolution, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1607,
1634 (2008) (“Fundamental (or human) rights are sometimes viewed as the basis of classical conflict of
laws . . . .”).
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APPENDIX
The CBP model of choice-of-law rules as presented in this Article is
illustrated in the following chart:

Choice-Based Perspective’s Model of Choice-of-Law Rules
Did the parties explicitly express their choice?

Parties Autonomy Principle Reasonable Connection Doctrine of Constructive Inference
IRTL

Classification into Private Law Categories

Property Law

Movable

Immovable

Place of Property

Juridical Indicators
IRTL

Contract

Unjust Enrichment

Tort

Place of Performance Place of Enrichment

Juridical Indicators

IRTL

Juridical Indicators

IRTL

Place of Wrong

Juridical Indicators

IRTL

